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The Search for Competent and
Representative Judges, Continued
By ROBERT P. DAvIDow*
INTRODUCTION
In 1981 this author published a set of four proposals for
judicial selection.' Three of these proposals had in common the
following elements: selection of a large nominating commission,
at least half of whom were to be elected by proportional repre-
sentation,2 with the remainder being elected by lawyers, judges,
* Professor of Law, George Mason University; A.B., Dartmouth, 1959; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1962; L.L.M., Harvard University, 1969; J.S.C., Columbia
University, 1982. The author acknowledges with gratitude the research assistance pro-
vided by Sheralyn S. Goldbecker, a law student at George Mason University.
I Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representativeness, 31
CASE W. Rrs. 409 (1981) [hereinafter Judicial Selection]. See generally Davidow, Beyond
Merit Selection: Judicial Careers Through Merit Promotion, 12 Tax. TEcH L. REv. 851
(1981) [hereinafter Beyond Merit Selection]; Davidow, Law Student Attitudes Towards
Judicial Careers, 50 U. CN. L. REv. 247 (1981).
For significant recent works on judicial selection see Judicial Selection: What Fits
Texas? A National Symposium on Judicial Selection and Tenure, 40 Sw. L.J. I (special
issue May 1986); Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri Plan,
64 WAsH. U.L.Q. 903 (1986); USC Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection, and
Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1555 (1988).
2 Proportional representation is a device, used primarily in certain Euro-
pean elections, to ensure more accurate representation. Such a device is a
response to the problem ... that minorities in any given electorate are
likely to remain unrepresented in a system of strict majority rule. Although
different types of proportional representation exist, the list system is the
simplest. Under that system, individuals vote for one of several lists of
candidates, each proposed by a particular party or faction. Each party or
faction is then entitled to the selection of the percentage of the total
number of candidates to be elected that corresponds to the percentage of
votes cast for its list....
Another type of proportional representation is the single transferable vote.
This system does not require party organization; instead, each voter lists
the candidates in order of preference with his or her second, third, and
even lower choices often being used to permit candidates to achieve the
minimum number of votes needed for selection. Greater flexibility is thereby
achieved with this system than with the list system.
Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 434-35 (footnotes omitted).
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and academicians; selection by that nominating commission of
a large number of nominees broadly reflecting the beliefs, atti-
tudes, and values of the commissioners; 3 and final selection by
lot4 from among the nominees. These proposals were premised
upon the belief that the twin goals of quality5 and
representativeness6 in judicial selection are not served by methods
such as partisan election, non-partisan election,7 gubernatorial
See id. at 440.
4 If the argument in favor of assuring representativeness with regard to
beliefs, attitudes, and values is accepted, then it is not difficult to accept
selection by lot, which in this context is merely a mechanism that achieves
more accurate representation. If nominees are relatively numerous and
appropriately representative on every occasion, the law of averages will
assure representative selection over time.
Id. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
I Other things being equal, the most intelligent people should be in gov-
ernment. No inconsistency need exist between a theory of democracy-at
least a theory of representative democracy, as contrasted with a theory of
pure democracy, such as that illustrated by the Greek city-state or the New
England town meeting-and a preference for the most intelligent represen-
tative. This author has personally observed judges who were apparently
unable to comprehend the arguments of counsel. Many other lawyers and
even non-lawyers seemingly have had the same experience. Neither the
actuality nor appearance of justice is served by such incompetence.
Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 419 (footnotes omitted).
6 Acceptance of quality as a legitimate goal of judicial selection leaves
unanswered the question whether judges should be representative of the
community in which they serve or accountable to that community. Here,
a distinction should be drawn between "accountability" and "representa-
tiveness." Some people have assumed that because judges make policy
decisions in deciding cases-e.g., the abortion and reapportionment deci-
sions of the Supreme Court-judges should be accountable, in apparently
the same way that legislators are thought to be accountable. This legislative
analogy should be rejected, however, because it assumes that the task of
the judge is no different from that of the legislator .... [T]he jury analogy,
suggesting that the second major goal of judicial selection is representa-
tiveness and not accountability, is more appropriate than the legislative
analogy.
Id. at 419-20 (footnotes omitted).
7 Problems with popular elections of judges include the following:
Even if the electorate could be given pertinent information concerning the
competence and attitudes of judicial candidates, it is unlikely that a system
of election could provide adequate representativeness. If, for example,
impecunious lawyers could obtain public funds to support their election
campaigns, wealthy candidates would still have a marked advantage in
light of Buckley v. Valeo, since it is doubtful that candidates could be
prevented constitutionally from spending their own money in a campaign.
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and legislative election (appointment), 8 and merit selection sys-
tems such as the Missouri Plan.9 The proposals were further
A more fundamental problem of representativeness is the potential for a
dilution of minority voting strength. This problem arises because the tra-
ditional form of election in the United States requires a majority vote for
victory. When voting is polarized along racial lines-a common phenom-
enon today-a Black minority constituting fifteen percent of the popula-
tion, for example, could never hope to elect a Black candidate to judicial
office.
Id. at 426-27 (footnotes omitted).
' Problems with executive appointment include the following:
Since political considerations are likely to be the sole or dominant consid-
eration in the appointment of judges... executive appointment is unlikely
to ensure either quality or representativeness. Although a requirement of
confirmation by a legislative or independent body may give some protection
against the appointment of grossly incompetent judges, the history of
senatorial confirmation, for example, is not reassuring. Even if such con-
firmation by an independent body provides a check on the appointment of
incompetent judges, the screening function performed by the senate or a
similar body provides no assurance of representativeness.
Id. at 428-29 (footnotes omitted).
1 The main problem with present merit selection plans is their failure to
assure sufficient representativeness. Under the original version of the merit
selection plan, which was adopted in Missouri, for example, three of the
seven members of the judicial nominating commission are appointed by
the governor-the chief politician in the state. Since the governor is usually
elected by majority vote and is likely to be committed to the views of his
or her constituency, virtually all of his or her appointments to the com-
mission will reflect such a majoritarian basis. Even where bipartisanship is
required, as in Colorado, only the two major parties are guaranteed rep-
resentation on the commission. The various groups, however, that are
particularly interested in, and are likely to be affected by, the work of the
courts do not necessarily arrange themselves along traditional party lines.
Sympathy or antipathy toward persons accused of crime, for example, is
not necessarily a function of party affiliation. Thus, bipartisanship on the
commission provides no assurance of representativeness. Furthermore, there
is no guarantee that representativeness of the commission as a whole will
be improved by the presence of members not appointed by the governor.
Although Watson and Downing concluded that the commissioners, espe-
cially lawyer commissioners, in Missouri did represent the various interest
groups fairly well, there is no structural guarantee that non-appointed
commissioners will represent the community at large or groups especially
interested in the courts.
Id. at 430-31 (footnotes omitted).
Originally, [the Missouri] plan called for the gubernatorial appointment of
one of the three nominees submitted by a judicial nominating commission
composed of three lawyers, elected by members of the State Bar Associa-
tion; three lay persons, appointed by the governor; and the chief justice
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
premised upon the belief that the appropriate analogue of the
judge is the jury, rather than the legislature.10 Judges, like jurors,
of the Missouri Supreme Court. After a specified period in office, each
judge had to run in a retention election in which voters could vote only
for or against the judge and not for another candidate; if the judge failed
to receive a majority of the vote, a new judicial selection process was
commenced.
Id. at 413 (footnotes omitted).
It was reported in 1985 that some form of merit selection had been adopted at
some level in thirty-four states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. D.
VANDENBERG, JUDIC IAL MERT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS (1985). Since then Connec-
ticut has adopted a form of merit selection. CoNN. GaN. STAT. ANN. § 51-44a (West
Supp. 1988).
11 There are at least two respects in which the role of judge in the United
States differs from that of the legislator. First, although legislators theo-
retically are bound to uphold the Constitution, as a practical matter, the
courts have assumed the task of assuring compliance with the fundamental
law. Thus, the role of the court is not to ascertain the will of the majority;
instead, it often involves enforcing the provisions of the Bill of Rights and
other constitutional limitations in the face of majoritarian opposition.
Although constitutional issues may arise more frequently in federal courts
than in state courts, almost any mundane state court adjudication can
involve federal constitutional issues. In particular, state criminal trials are
subject to a myriad of federal constitutional limitations developed through
recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Also, civil matters adjudicated in
state courts-for example, a suit to enforce a restrictive covenant in a
deed, a suit for the wrongful death of a mother brought by her illegitimate
children, and garnishment proceedings-often raise federal constitutional
issues.
In fact, almost any state cause of action is potentially subject to a due
process or equal protection challenge. Thus, although many cases tried in
state court do not raise constitutional issues, the potential for constitutional
assault is sufficiently great to justify the assumption that such issues will
arise regularly. Even if no other factors were involved, this need to enforce
limits on majority rule would be sufficient to justify a system of judicial
selection different from that used to select legislators. The value judgment
implicit in this conclusion, should be made explicit: Our Constitution strikes
a balance between majority rule and the protection of individual rights;
the latter is as important as the former, and the courts are the preeminent
guarantors of the latter.
Second, the role of judges in a complex society is inherently different from
that of legislators. In general, the legislature adopts general principles to
be applied prospectively, but the courts apply general principles, previously
determined, to existing disputes. The significance of this distinction as to
accountability is readily apparent. When legislators, acting prospectively,
attempt to determine present popular attitudes or anticipate future ones to
ensure their re-election, no threat is posed to the reasonable expectations
of private persons. There can be no detrimental reliance, therefore, when
[VOL. 77
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must be representative of the community in which they serve.
This article first reviews the jury analogy."', Next, the necessity
for judges who represent the views of not only the majority is
discussed 12 and highlighted by recent events. 3 This article con-
cludes by discussing some practical difficulties with the imple-
mentation of the proposed nominating commissions.14
I. THE JURY ANALOGY
A. The Functions of Judge and Jury
Judge and jury perform very similar, although not identical,
functions. While the chief function of jurors is to make findings
of historical fact, judges also perform this function when trying
cases without jurors and when ruling on such matters as motions
to suppress evidence in criminal cases. 5 Both jurors and judges
apply legal principles to historical facts. Judges, however, estab-
lish the legal principles to apply, whereas jurors presumably
accept instructions from judges as to the applicable legal prin-
ciples. While this distinction holds true in the main, it is not
always valid.' 6 Jury instructions are sometimes so general that
the statute has completely prospective effect. If judges, however, decide
cases in accordance with their best estimate of present or future popular
attitudes, private parties' reasonable reliance on past precedents may not
be protected.
Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 420-22 (footnotes omitted).
" See infra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
"1 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1986) (determination of whether certain
evidence, obtained unlawfully, should nevertheless be admitted because the prosecution
had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence inevitably would
have been discovered even without the illegal conduct).
26 One study of selective service cases concludes in part as follows:
The analysis of verdicts in selective service cases suggests that jurors
sometimes judge laws as well as defendants-convicting more frequently
when the public approves of legal norms or purposes they are serving, and
convicting less frequently when the government policy being supported
through the criminal law is in dispute. It would seem that this jury
legislating is normally a subconscious phenomenon, for most jurors no
doubt honestly believe that they are faithfully adhering to their prescribed
KENTUCKY LAW JouNA.[
jurors find themselves first establishing legal principles before
applying them. For example, some versions of the jury instruc-
tion with regard to the issue of insanity have been described as,
in effect, a direction to the jury to decide the issue of moral
blameworthiness.17 At this level of abstraction, jurors must de-
cide what moral blameworthiness means in a particular context,
and then decide whether the defendant is morally blameworthy
under that standard.18 Another example is the application of the
traditional "reasonably prudent" person standard in tort ac-
tions. 19 Again, the standard is so general that the jury in effect
decides the legal principle to apply to the historical facts.
B. Jury Attributes that Judges Ought to Have
If in fact judges and jurors perform very similar functions,
one may then ask which of the attributes of the jury are attrib-
utes that we should also find in judges? Two principal attributes
are representativeness and nonmajoritarianism.
role of applying legal standards logically and interpreting the evidence
objectively, even as they evaluate the laws on the books.
Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 605, 633.
7 See R. SimoN, THE JuRy AND THE DEFENSE OF INsAMrrY (1967).
11 In discussing the majority's decision to abandon the Durham test of criminal
responsibility in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge Bazelon
commented: "Nothing in the Court's opinion today suggests a departure from our long-
standing view that the second of these two functions-the evaluation of the defendant's
impairment in light of community standards of blameworthiness-is the very essence of
the jury's role." Id. at 1030 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11 The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of
behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it
impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human
conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature
of a formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left
to the jury, or to the court. The standard of conduct which the community
demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual
judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as
possible, the same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites. At
the same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the
actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which
he must act.
The courts have dealt with this very difficult problem by creating a fictitious
person, who never has existed on land or sea: the "reasonable man of
ordinary prudence."
PROSSER AND KEATON ON Ta LAw oF TORTS 173-74 (W. Keaton gen. ed. 5th ed. 1984)
(footnotes omitted).
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The representative nature of the jury is the most obvious
attribute. Jurors are typically selected at random to represent,
as nearly as practicable, a cross-section of the community.20 They
are representative of the community in part because we cannot
think of anyone else better suited to resolve factual issues,21 in
light of the way in which people perceive facts differently22 and
are influenced by various beliefs, attitudes, and values. 23 Appli-
cation of the jury analogy to judges may require the use of
The pertinent federal statutes provide in part:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
Each United States district court shall devise and place into operation a
written plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors that shall be
designed to achieve the objectives of sections 1861 and 1862 of this title,
and that shall otherwise comply with the provisions of this title.
Id. at § 1863(a).
The representativeness of juries could be improved by updating current methods of
jury selection. See, e.g., Ashman, California Holds Voter Lists Too Narrow to Select
Jurors, 70 A.B.A. J. 149 (Aug. 1984); Knowles & Hickman, Selecting a Jury of Peers:
How Close Do We Get?, 12 J. POL. Sci. & ADmIN. 207 (1984); Logan & Cole, Reducing
Bias in Jury Source List by Combining Voters and Drivers, 67 JUDicATURE 87 (1983);
McCauley & Heubel, Achieving Representative Juries: A System That Works, 65 JUrDi-
cATUmE 126 (1981); Kairys, Kadane and Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate
for Multiple Source List, 65 CAiur. L. Rav. 803 (1977). The fact that present methods
have not achieved maximum representativeness does not alter the fact that representa-
tiveness remains the goal of jury selection.
21 This is implicit in the Court's statement in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968), that "[i]f the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to
the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to
have it."
The jury is, of course, designed to do other things, including preventing oppression
by the government. Id. at 155 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965)).
n For discussion of the concept of selective perception, see, e.g., Hastorf & Cantril,
They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. AaNOmA.L & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 129 (1954).
" For a discussion of the distinction between and among the concepts of "beliefs,"
"attitudes," and "values," see M. ROKEACH, BELrEFS, ATTITUDEs, AND VALurs (1970).
For discussion of how one's attitude toward capital punishment might affect one's
inclination to find a defendant guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, see authorities
discussed in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Not every study has shown a
relationship between attitude and a propensity to find a defendant guilty or not guilty
in a criminal case. See, e.g., Sealy, Another Look at Social Psychological Aspects of
Jury Bias, 5 L. & HuM. BmfAv. 187 (1981).
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multi-judge panels at trials without juries and at hearings at
which important factual determinations are made.
24
A second attribute of the jury is its nonmajoritarianism.
When a jury must decide a case unanimously, the will of the
majority is sometimes thwarted. Even one member of a twelve-
person jury can thwart the will of the remaining eleven. 25 Simi-
larly, when judges decide cases they often must enforce certain
principles against majority rule. The chief example of this is
found in the enforcement of the Bill of Rights in the face of
contrary majority view expressed through legislative action.
This nonmajoritarianism is historically easy to explain: When
the Constitution was written in 1787, commonly accepted prin-
ciples of natural law and natural rights greatly influenced the
founders; the assumption was that these principles would be
enforced regardless of current majority views. 26 Even apart from
the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791,27 the original Constitution
contains explicit limitations on the exercise of governmental
power, both on the part of the federal government 28 and on the
part of the governments of the several states.
29
- Although it may be assumed that the use of multi-judge panels would add to
the cost of the administration of justice, such an increase would be offset to some degree
if suggestions to provide alternative dispute resolution were implemented. See generally,
Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 CRMGHToN
L. Rav. 801 (1988); Lambrose, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1985).
The Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment requires unanimous jury
verdicts in federal criminal cases. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49
(1948). Further, the Supreme Court has not permitted, thus far, nonunanimous state
juries where the proportion required for conviction was below 75%. The Supreme Court
upheld a nonunanimous state jury verdict in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972),
where nine of the twelve jurors voted to convict; this 75% requirement is the same
requirement found in article V of the Constitution, requiring ratification of proposed
amendments by legislatures or conventions in 3/4 of the states. Thus, even with regard
to nonunanimous juries, strict majority rule has not been permitted to operate.
See generally J. STONE, HumAN LAW AND HUMAN JusTicE 88-104 (1965); Cor-
win, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L.
Rav. 149 (1928); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. Rav. 365 (1929) (second installment).
27 A brief discussion of the argument that the ninth amendment was intended to
embody the natural law/natural rights tradition is found, for example, in Davidow,
George Mason on the Tension Between Majority Rule and Minority Rights, 10 GEORGE
MASON U.L. Rav. 1, 23-24 n.87 (1987).
28 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (powers denied to Congress).
" Id. at § 10 (powers denied to the states).
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C. One Desirable Dissimilarity
Jurors are ordinarily representative of the community with
regard to intellectual ability; no systematic effort is made to get
the brightest and best educated people on the jury 0 Concomi-
tantly, it is desirable for the brightest and best-trained judges
whose beliefs, attitudes, and values are broadly representative
of those of the community to be on the bench. This is consistent
with the concept of representative, as contrasted with direct,
democracy.
31
II. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE APPLICATION OF THIS
NEW METHOD OF SELECTION TO TRIAL COURTS AND APPELLATE
COURTS
To the extent that appellate courts announce new principles
of law,32 one might be tempted to say that it is more important
to have representativeness at the appellate level, especially as an
attribute of the United States Supreme Court. 33 As a practical
10 "[S]election of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community
is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). Any effort to obtain jurors who were not repre-
sentative of the intellectual capacities of the persons in the community would run afoul
of the sixth amendment and, in the case of the states, the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 530.
" Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 419.
3 It is not unusual today to find a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, admitting that the Court makes new law:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly
suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with Amer-
ican and English legal history, and involves a departure from a long line
of precedent does not prove either that the Court has exceeded its powers
or that the Court is wrong or unwise in its present reinterpretation of the
Fifth Amendment. It does, however, underscore the obvious-that the
Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's decision, nor
has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make
new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what
the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will
continue to do unless there is some fundamental change in the constitu-
tional distribution of governmental powers.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
31 This importance is illustrated by the possibility that the Supreme Court, with
Justice Kennedy now a member, may overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This
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matter, however, the application of principles to facts may be
of greater significance, especially when one considers that deci-
sions based at least in part on fact-finding are unlikely to be
reviewed at the appellate level and even less likely to be over-
turned on review.34 This is true precisely because one of the
chief functions of the trial court is to find the facts. Therefore,
it may be more important to establish this method of providing
for greater representativeness at the trial court level.
One cannot appreciate the significance of representativeness
in fact-finding without acknowledging the extent to which people
perceive and evaluate facts differently. The concept of selective
perception is well recognized in psychology. 35 People tend to
perceive what they expect to perceive. These expectations are
influenced by personality factors such as beliefs, attitudes, and
values-themselves the product of both genetic and environmen-
tal factors.3 6 The drawing of inferences from established histor-
ical facts-that is, fact evaluation and application of legal
possibility is perhaps implicit in the Court's affirmance, by an equally divided vote, of
a decision involving a challenge to a state law placing certain restraints on the performing
of abortions. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1064
(1988). Moreover, Justice Blackmun has expressly stated that the overturning of Roe is
a distinct possibility. Washington Post, September 14, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
3" It is true that the United States Court of Military Review may review the facts:
It may affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part
or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and deter-
mines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. In considering
the record, it may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses,
and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial
court saw and heard the witnesses.
10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (1982). The United States Court of Military Review is most unusual
in this respect, however.
.The United States Supreme Court often reviews the trial court's findings of fact in
first amendment cases. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-
92 (1964) (evidence constitutionally insufficient to show that defendant in libel case acted
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984) (Appellate judges applying New York Times v.
Sullivan must exercise independent judgment in examining the record and determine
whether it shows actual malice with convincing clarity.). Much more rarely does the
Supreme Court review the facts in other cases; it does occasionally do so, however. See,
e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (rejection of lower court finding that
there was no danger to the public arising out of police ignorance, of the location of a
handgun left somewhere in a grocery store shortly after midnight).
See Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 22.
See generally M. ROKEACH, supra note 23.
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principles to historical facts-is similarly influenced by an indi-
vidual's beliefs, attitudes, and values.
37
Suppose that a defendant is accused of having committed
the crime of attempting to obstruct justice by threats directed
toward police officers. Three individuals testify at trial.38 The
principal arresting officer testifies that the defendant's arrest was
based on information, erroneously stored in a police computer,
that indicated there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the
defendant. The officer then testifies that the defendant, follow-
ing his arrest, made a number of statements to the officer or
within his hearing: "I am going to get you." "I am going to
sue you for false arrest." "If I lose, I'll get you some other
way." "I've got five friends to help me take care of him" [the
principal arresting officer]. The second witness, an officer who
assisted in the arrest, testifies that, in addition to stating that he
would sue the police officer, the defendant, shortly after his
arrest and before arriving at the police station, said, "I am going
to get [the first arresting officer] if I have to kill him." The
second arresting officer also testifies that at the police station,
when the first arresting officer was out of the room, the defen-
dant said that he was going to kill "him." The second arresting
officer testifies that he thought that "him" was a reference to
the first arresting officer. The defendant testifies that while he
threatened to sue the arresting officer, he never threatened to
kill anyone.
Which version of these facts would a juror accept? Would
the juror be influenced by a general disposition to believe-or
disbelieve-police officers? Suppose that the arresting officers
are white; the defendant is black. 39 Would the juror be affected
by the race of the witnesses? Would he or she pay attention not
only to the differences between the defendant's testimony and
that of the police officers, but also to the differences between
the versions given by the two police officers? (Would it be
significant, for example, that the first arresting officer does not
37 Id.
11 These facts are essentially those found in Polk v. Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d
770 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
3' Telephone interview with Stephen C. Gregory, defense attorney in Polk (March
23, 1989).
1988-89]
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refer to a death threat, whereas the second officer describes a
death threat supposedly made in the presence of the first arrest-
ing officer?) 4° Regardless of which version of the facts would be
accepted by a juror, would that version constitute an attempt to
obstruct justice in light of the fact that the two arresting officers
are large and the defendant is of slight build4' and was in
handcuffs during most of the time during which the threats
supposedly were made? Attempt requires an intent to obstruct,
and that intention must be inferred from all of the facts and
circumstances. 42 Would an intent to seek personal revenge at
some indefinite future time constitute an "intent to obstruct
justice"? What would be the significance of the defendant's
understandable anger resulting from the fact that the apparent
outstanding warrant for his arrest was the result of computer
error?
III. Ti SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT EvENTs
Two recent events of interest are the rejection of Rose Bird
and two of her colleagues in the California retention election of
November 1986, 43 and the rejection by the United States Senate
of President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to be an
40 The discrepancy between the testimony of the two arresting officers is not
mentioned in the opinion of the court of appeals in Polk; it is, however, found through
an examination of the trial transcript. See Commonwealth v. Pike, Trial Record at 30,
No. 52-1985, Circuit Court of Fauquier County, Commonwealth of Virginia, October
11, 1985.
Failure of the court of appeals in Polk to mention this discrepancy is probably
explained by the fact that, following conviction, the reviewing court wil normally
construe the facts in a manner most favorable to the winning side-here, the prosecution.
In so construing the facts, the court is free to pick and chose among those statements
made at trial that are most favorable to the prosecution's side; thus, the court can, as
it did in Polk, ignore the discrepancy and simply refer to the uncontradicted testimony
of the second officer that a death threat was made at the police station in the absence
of the first arresting officer. This circumstance merely highlights the importance of fact-
finding at trial.
41 Telephone interview, supra note 39.
41 Polk, 358 S.E.2d at 773.
,1 For an analysis of the defeat of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her
colleagues, see Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign,
the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JuDIcATURE 348 (1987);
Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the
California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 2007 (1988).
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associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.44 Each of
these occurrences illustrates a problem with representativeness.
The failure of Rose Bird and two of her colleagues to be
retained on the California Supreme Court illustrates the principle
that representativeness is at risk when popular election is possi-
ble, even after an initial selection of a member of the court.
Judicial retention elections make it possible for a popular ma-
jority to remove those expressing minority viewpoints from the
bench; 45 the end result is a judiciary that represents a smaller
portion of the spectrum of community beliefs, attitudes, and
values.46
In the case of Robert Bork, lack of representativeness is
demonstrated at the initial selection stage. The problem with the
selection of Bork was not that his views could be regarded as
very extreme; 47 under this author's proposals someone with views
as extreme as those of Bork could still be selected for any
particular court. The problem is that this was attempted in a
context in which there was no guarantee of representativeness;
President Reagan ostensibly represented a majority view at one
particular point in time, but there is no guarantee that in the
- For an analysis of the defeat of Judge Bork, see, e.g., Ackerman, Transfor-
mative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1988).
• In the case of Rose Bird, her minority viewpoint was apparent opposition to
capital punishment as such, as reflected in her judicial opinions. "Essentially, Bird's
opponents charged her with being soft on criminal matters, especially the death pen-
alty .... ." Wold & Culver, supra note 43, at 350.
"6 Consider that while Rose Bird was being rejected by the voters in California
because of her apparent opposition to the death penalty, Justices Brennan and Marshall
of the United States Supreme Court were continuing a consistent course of action since
1976: They dissented from the denial of petitions for writs of certiorari in death penalty
cases, asserting that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 227, 231 (1976) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); King v.
Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 249, 249 (1986) (Brennen, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); Davis v.
Georgia, 479 U.S. 871, 872 (1986) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 There is little doubt that the views Bork expressed were extreme: In effect he
claimed that the first amendment protects only speech that is "explicitly political." Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
Presumably this expression was intended to exclude all art and literature. His subsequent
apparent change of heart was accepted by the Senate Judicial Committee during his
confirmation hearings in 1987 with a measure of skepticism. See S. Exac. REP. No. 7,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1987).
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federal system of selection of judges there will be sufficient
representativeness at one time or over time.
Even if one assumes that representativeness can be achieved
at any one time-a questionable assumption in view of the
tendency of presidents to appoint persons who share their beliefs,
attitudes, and values4 8-one must note that members of the
Supreme Court, along with lower federal judges, hold their
offices in effect for life; 49 they serve longer than the term of the
president who actually elects them. This latter problem explains
in part why appellate court judges should be limited to a single
fifteen-year term.
50
IV. PRAcncAL DImICuLTiEs ASSOCIATED WITH THE WORK OF
THE PROPOSED NOINATING COMMISSIONS
Although this article provides a theoretical justification for
a broadly representative nominating commission that would se-
lect a large number of judicial nominees from whom a final
selection would be made by lot,51 the question remains whether
such a system would work in practice. In particular, the question
arises whether twelve commissioners, for example, could or would
cooperate sufficiently in the unanimous selection of twelve nom-
inees when each of the commissioners had, in effect, a veto
power over the nominations by the other members of the com-
mission. Unanimous selection of nominees would be necessary
49 From 1933 to 1962, for example, the percentage of appointments from those of
the President's own party ranged from a low of 75% in the case of Truman to a high
of 100% in the case of Kennedy. J. GRossmwA, LAWYERS AND JuDaEs 28 (1965). This
partisan system of appointments has continued into the present. See, e.g., Gotschall,
Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution, 70 JuDIcATURE 48 (1986); Note, All the President's Men? A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 CoLuM. L. RP'v. 766
(1987).
49 "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNsY.
art. III, § 1.
"o Beyond Merit Selection, supra note 1, at 877-82. Consider also the proposal to
limit a Supreme Court justice to an 18-year, non-renewable term. Oliver, Systematic
Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for
Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 799, 801 (1986).
" See Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 434-36.
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to ensure that those commissioners representing minority view-
points would be able to insist upon the inclusion, within the list
of nominees, of nominees espousing their views.
52
There is reason to believe that commissioners might very well
proceed, as this article originally suggested, by saying to one
another, "If you want me to refrain from vetoing those whom
you prefer, you had better not veto my choice." ' 53 Further, the
commissioners to whom such a remark had been made might
respond, "If you do not want us to veto your choice, you had
better make sure that your choice is well-qualified. ' ' 54 Here the
concept of role morality, as recognized by sociologists, is im-
portant.
55
Persons assigned a particular role come to internalize the
values attached to that role. This is evident in the case of jurors
who are expected to apply the judge's instructions. The juror's
generalized duty to obey the law is made more concrete in the
specific instructions received from the judge. Studies suggest that
jurors are successful in doing this to a considerable degree;
5 6
moreover, in jurisdictions where unanimity is required, juries
11 Id. at 441.
53 Id.
54 Id.
11 Role morality represents this impersonal element in morality. In a role
one is a person of a certain kind put in a certain kind of relationship, and
thus detached from purely personal idiosyncrasy. We shall be concerned
later with whether a person can also achieve detachment from his roles;
that is another story. Here we are concerned with the character of role
morality. As a directive for behaviour in certain kinds of relationships, it
is structured by rules; if not by explicit and sanctioned rules, at least by
implicit understandings, and maxims, or rules of thumb, as to how such a
person would behave in this kind of relationship.
D. EmmET, RusLas, RoLas AND RELAMoNS 158 (1966).
Other factors besides that of role morality determine behavior in any particular
situation. For discussion of the relative influence of role, personality, and social situation,
see McCall, Discretionary Justice: Influences of Social Role, Personality, and Social
Situation in PERSONALrry, RoLas, AND SociAL BMAwIoR 285 (N. Ickes & E. Knowles
eds. 1982).
m See, e.g., the discussion of the Hinckley trial in V. HANs & N. VmsaR, JUDGING
THm JURY 179-98 (1986). Apparently the jury was able to understand and apply the
judge's instructions regarding insanity. The same authors also conclude, after a review
of the extant empirical studies, that "[t]he jury has not been shown, as a general matter,
to be incompetent." Id. at 129.
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ultimately fail to reach agreement in only about five percent of
the cases.
57
A critic may say that five percent, although a small percent-
age in the abstract, would represent a fairly large number of
actual instances in which commissioners would be unable to
perform their assigned task of unanimously choosing twelve
nominees. The work of commissioners is not, however, a zero-
sum game;58 that is, the fact that one commissioner "wins" (that
is to say, has his or her choice included among the twelve
nominees), does not mean that one or more of the other com-
missioners must "lose." They still can have their preferences
included among the group of twelve. This contrasts with the
situation in which a jury often has only two choices: "guilty"
or "not guilty."
'59
This author cannot prove that such a system would work
since this system has never been tried before. The same would
be true, however, of any proposal to create mechanisms involv-
ing human interaction. Thus, if the burden is to prove feasibility,
it cannot be met. On the other hand, one can just as easily
argue that the burden should be on the opponents of this pro-
posal to prove its lack of feasibility.
CONCLUSION
Because judges are more like jurors than legislators, they
ought to be as broadly representative of the community with
respect to their beliefs, attitudes, and values as are jurors. More-
over, they need to be as free from pressure to yield to current
majority sentiment as are jurors. This conclusion supports a
17 In their study of 3576 trials, Kalven and Zeisel reported that the rate of hung
juries was 5.5%. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEizCAN JuRy 57 (1966).
" See generally J. VON NEWMANN AND 0. MORGENSTERN, ThEbRY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMC BEHAVIOR (3rd ed. 1953).
19 A jury can sometimes compromise by finding a defendant guilty of a lesser
included offense. For example, a defendant charged with murder might be found not
guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. In such a situation the choices would be
broader than simply "guilty" or "not guilty." Nevertheless, in such a situation jurors
contending for a verdict of "guilty" of murder and those contending for acquittal would
not get their first choice-a situation different from that existing with respect to the
work of commissioners, who would be able to insist on the nomination of someone
sharing their beliefs, attitudes, and values. See Judicial Selection, supra note 1, at 441.
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proposal to choose judges by lot from among a large group of
nominees selected by commissioners whose beliefs, attitudes, and
values are broadly representative of those of the entire commu-
nity. Such a commission could ensure that nominees possess the
requisite competence. Moreover, with role morality and the ab-
sence of a zero-sum game, it is likely that commissioners would
cooperate with one another in carrying out their responsibilities,
even when required to act unanimously.

